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Abstract
During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the world witnessed an
increasing number of regional conflict management efforts undertaken by
regional inter-governmental organisations. There are therefore strong reasons
to study the advantages and disadvantages of mediation efforts by regional
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organisations, and compare these with initiatives taken by the United Nations
(UN). In this article, we argue that regional organisations have certain charac-
teristics that in principle make them effective mediators. They are ‘insiders’,
closely connected to the conflict at hand, with an intimate knowledge about
local conditions, and a stake in the outcome. This article builds on experi-
ence from ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States)
interventions in West Africa to analyse the pros and cons of regional 
mediation. We find that the interventions did indeed produce beneficial
results, but that ECOWAS mediation efforts were disturbed by the fact that its
activities were seen as highly partial. We recommend regional mediators to be
‘impartial insiders’, paying special attention to creating relations of trust with
all actors involved.
Introduction
During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the world witnessed an
increasing number of mediation and other forms of peaceful intervention
efforts undertaken by regional intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). In
Central America, for example, peace agreements were negotiated in 
El Salvador and Nicaragua with the help of the Organization of American
States (OAS). In West Africa, ECOWAS intervened in the civil wars in Liberia
and Sierra Leone. The Arab League tried – unsuccessfully as it turned out –
to mediate in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. The European Union (EU) was
involved in numerous intervention activities, ranging from good offices to
peacekeeping, in the former Yugoslavia. At times, such regional initiatives
were conducted in conjunction with the UN; at other times such initiatives
were undertaken unilaterally, and independently of the UN.
There are good reasons to believe that regional conflict management
efforts in the Third World will become even more frequent. Great powers and
supra-national institutions have demonstrated a diminishing desire to
become physically and financially involved in far-away conflicts. Discussions
have started on how to create a division of labour between the global organi-
sation, the UN, and regional organisations, with respect to responsibility for
conflict resolution. In Chapter VIII of the UN Charter regional organisations
are encouraged to deal with conflicts in their ‘own back-yard’, provided their
activities are consistent with the principles of the UN. Such actions must be
approved by the Security Council, and the regional organisation must then
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report to the Council on those actions. There are thus strong reasons to study
the advantages and disadvantages of mediation efforts by regional organisa-
tions, and compare these with initiatives undertaken by the UN. 
We argue that regional organisations have certain advantages vis-à-vis
the UN. We wish here to utilise research by Paul Wehr and John Paul
Lederach (1996), and suggest that regional organisations have characteristics
that in principle make them effective mediators. They are ’partial insiders’,
closely connected to the conflict at hand, with an intimate knowledge about
local conditions, shared norms or experiences with the parties in conflict, and
a stake in the outcome of the conflict. Geographical proximity and deep
knowledge about the conflict arguably create favourable conditions for 
effective mediation.
This article builds on experience from ECOWAS interventions in 
West Africa to analyse the pros and cons of regional mediation and to test this
argument. What lessons can be drawn and what recommendations can be
derived from these cases? We find that the ECOWAS interventions did indeed
produce beneficial results, but that its mediation efforts were disturbed 
and distorted by the fact that its activities were seen as highly partial. We
recommend regional organisations to be ‘impartial insiders’, paying special
attention to creating relations of trust with all actors involved in the conflict.
We commence by first outlining our theoretical ideas concerning
insider-partial vs. outsider-neutral mediators. In the following section, the
increasingly important role of regional mediation initiatives is described. The
empirical part first highlights the positive aspects of the ECOWAS mission 
by presenting important functions that its activities fulfilled. Thereafter, 
the problems ECOWAS experienced, which created severe obstacles for its
ambition to solve the conflicts, are analysed. We end by discussing what role
(im)partiality plays in international mediation efforts and what the implica-
tions are for future regional peace initiatives.
Outsider-neutral vs. Insider-partial Mediators
The answer to the question ‘who should be selected as a third party?’ was
traditionally that the mediator should be a neutral outsider (Hopmann
1996:223; Wehr & Lederach 1996). According to this view, neutrality (or
impartiality – these terms being used here as synonyms) is seen as a neces-
sary tool in the armoury of the successful mediator (Carnevale & Arad
1996:40-41; Young 1967:309). The third party should preferably have no ties
to any of the parties and no stake whatsoever in the conflict outcome; he or
she is ideally ‘not connected to either disputant, is not biased toward either
side, has no investment in any outcome... and does not expect any special
reward from either side’ (Wehr & Lederach 1996:57). These traits were
supposed to increase the credibility of the mediator and make him or her
acceptable to all parties, but also to enhance his or her possibilities of getting
information from the disputants and increase the legitimacy of the proposed
solutions (Kleiboer 1998:29; Carnevale & Arad 1996:41).
Today, this assumption is questioned by many mediation scholars. The
idea of mediator neutrality is puzzling, as ‘any intervention that turns a dyad
into a triad simply cannot be neutral’ (Bercovitch 1992:6). Active interven-
tion by a third party affects both the substance and the likelihood of an
agreement (Gibson et al. 1996:70-71). If mediation is conceived as an exten-
sion of negotiation, as ‘three-cornered bargaining’ with the mediator as one of
the players (Carnevale & Arad 1996:41; cf. Princen 1992:23), it is difficult to
associate mediation closely with neutrality. Indeed, there seems to exist a
consensus that ‘it is the mediators’ resources and ability to effect change,
rather than their perceived impartiality, that determine their acceptability
and effectiveness (Jönsson 2002:222; cf. Zartman & Touval 1985:255). In
brief, mediation analysts today assert that neutrality is problematic and that
the effectiveness of impartiality is contingent: under some circumstances,
impartiality results in efficiency, but this may not be true in other contexts.
Often, the best one can hope for is a third party that is not biased in the sense
that she or he is willing to sacrifice the interests of one of the parties in favour
of those of the other (Hopmann 1996:225).
In an influential article, Paul Wehr and John Paul Lederach (1996)
suggested that effective mediation may also be performed by what they call
‘insider-partials’. Based on their observations of Central American mediation,
they proposed that internality and partiality may under certain circumstances
lead to successful mediation outcomes. The insider-partials are mediators
from the conflict area. They have a stake in the outcome and will have to live
with the consequences of their work. The trust that parties feel for the insider
mediator is a result not of perceived neutrality, but of the intimate knowledge
of and connections to the disputants that the mediator has. Interpersonal,
face-to-face relationships are important in ensuring that the parties to the
conflict will accept the mediator. Previous experiences result in expectations
that the insider mediator will work for a just and durable settlement. Wehr
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and Lederach contend that the effectiveness of insider-neutrals may be 
particular to ‘more traditional societies’ who rely heavily on interpersonal
trust and personal relationships. They further suggest that this type of 
mediation should be seen as a positive complement to intervention by
outsider-neutrals.
Wehr and Lederach closely link being an insider to partiality, but they
are not very clear in their usage of the latter term. For them, partiality seems
to rest in the closeness and previous ties a mediator has to the disputants.
This is, however, only one among several possible meanings of partiality, the
one that we would call relational partiality. Equally important is processual
partiality, where the mediator favours one party during the negotiation
process, for example by listening more closely to that party, and outcome
partiality, which means that the mediator deliberately favours one of the
conflicting parties in its proposals for settlements (cf. Elgström 2001). As
these types of partiality are not necessarily associated, any discussion on the
usefulness of impartiality should clearly stake out what type is being debated.
Regional vs. Global Mediators
International conflict management is conducted by many actors, undertaking
different forms of conflict management. Mediation is undoubtedly one of the
most common forms of conflict management. Mediation can be undertaken by
numerous actors, not the least of which are regional and international organi-
sations. In a study of formal conflict management in international disputes
from 1945 to 1995, a total of 3 737 different conflict management efforts
(negotiation, arbitration, mediation, etc.) were identified (Bercovitch & Diehl
1997). Over 2 100 of these efforts involved mediation. The UN and other
regional organisations engaged in close to 1 300 of these efforts. The UN and
regional organisations clearly outnumber mediation efforts by states or 
individuals. We should not lose sight of just how often regional organisations
and/or the UN initiate and undertake mediation.
In Table 1 (see page 16) we show the geographical distribution of 
160 disputes in the 1945-1995 period which experienced regional or UN
mediation, and the frequency of mediation efforts by each body.
Mediation by regional organisations or the UN is a popular method of
conflict management because it allows the parties to retain control over the
outcome, while gaining more flexibility over the process. Whether undertaken
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Table 1: Geographic Distribution of International Disputes 
and Mediation Activities
Table 2: Regional vs. Global Mediation
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by regional actors or other bodies, mediation’s goals are: to stop violence and
hostility, reduce fatalities, and achieve a political settlement. These are the
criteria of successful mediation. In Table 2 we offer information on the extent
of mediation involvement by regional organisations and the UN, and a
comparative analysis of their rate of success, e.g. the extent to which each
mediation effort contributed to achieving any of the objectives above (For
further details on operationalisations and measurement, see Bercovitch &
Diehl 1997). The data suggest that regional organisations are more successful
mediators than the UN. As our data do not distinguish between different types
of conflict, this result must, however, be interpreted cautiously.
In Table 3 we offer more specific information on the extent to which
regional organisations or the UN achieve any of the specific objectives of
mediation. We can see from the information below that mediation by regional
organisations achieved a full settlement in 8.2 per cent of the cases in which
they were involved, compared to only 3.1 per cent by the UN. Regional organ-
isations achieved some success with their mediation (that is a cease-fire,
partial or full settlement) in 42.1 per cent of cases; the UN achieved success
in 32.1 per cent only.
Regional organisations are co-operative organisations based on geographical
proximity, social and political similarity, interdependence, and a commitment
to regional security. As such, regional organisations are more likely to be
familiar with local issues, the situation and the parties in conflict. We main-
tain that regional organisations that intervene in regionally bounded conflicts
often share the characteristics of insider-partials. Their members are often
immediately affected by the conflict and they cannot leave the post-negotia-
tion situation. This makes them take a greater interest in managing or
Table 3: Categories of Mediation Outcome
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mitigating a conflict, lest it escalate and engulf the whole region. Regional
organisations thus have a vested interest in managing a regional conflict.
Their closeness to, and knowledge of, the local context give them an advan-
tage as conflict managers compared to an outsider, like the UN.
Relational partiality is probably an inherent trait in regional insider
mediators, as they have asymmetrical historical ties and bonds to the
conflicting parties. This does not mean, however, that they are necessarily
less effective than neutral outsiders. Furthermore, a regional mediator may
well demonstrate both processual and outcome impartiality. How regional
mediators have behaved in this respect is a matter for empirical research. 
Regional organisations have a further advantage over outside third parties
or the UN in the area of mediation: getting the UN involved internationalises a
conflict; having a regional organisation, mediating from within, as it were,
keeps the conflict local. Most parties in conflict would rather keep a conflict
localised, rather than face the prospect of some form of international interven-
tion. They would regard regionalisation as preferable to internationalisation.  
Thus our argument here is that in most international conflicts, a regional
organisation would be preferable as a mediator to the UN, because of (a) its
superior knowledge of local conflicts, and strong incentives to resolve them,
(b) proximity to a conflict, and ability to react faster, and (c) the ability of a
regional organisation to provide forums for formal discussions and informal
dialogues (Black 1996; Diehl 1994; Jones & Duffey 1996; Marnika 1996). 
Lessons from ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone
A brief background
Established in 1975, ECOWAS was designed to promote economic develop-
ment and political unity within the West African region through an integration
of the economies of its members. Since its inception, ECOWAS has striven to
promote the economic growth of the region and to guarantee economic and
political stability, but also to further social and cultural integration (Obiozor
et al. 1991). Goal attainment has, however, been hampered by economic
constraints and by regional insecurity. Trying to reach the goals of integration
in an environment characterised by violence and enmity is clearly a daunting
task.
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In order to reconceptualise its role concerning regional security,
ECOWAS in 1981 agreed on a ‘Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence’
(Yoroms 1999). But it was not until the early 1990s that ECOWAS became
actively involved in regional security affairs. The civil wars that erupted in
Liberia in 1989 and subsequently in Sierra Leone in 1991 soon revealed how
easily internal conflict could lead to a destabilisation of the entire region. The
members of ECOWAS were directly affected by the instability in the two
countries and this constituted a powerful motivation for them to engage in
regional peace efforts. The result was mediation initiatives and intervention
in both cases.
To detail the history of the two conflicts, and the role of ECOWAS in
them, is well beyond the scope of this article (see Adebajo 2002a and b;
Berman & Sams 2000; Tudor 2000; Barclay 1999; Hutchful 1999). Instead,
we first delineate what contributions ECOWAS made to the peace processes
and what major functions it fulfilled, alone or in conjunction with the UN.
Thereafter, we analyse what weak spots can be detected in its mediation
efforts and the reasons for these deficiencies. In both sections, we refer to the
insider-partial mediation model to explain out findings.
The Benefits of Insider-partial Mediation
To begin with, it should be emphasised that peace accords have been
concluded in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. This is at least partly due to
external mediation and pressure, where the ECOWAS mission has been the
most prominent actor (Berman & Sams 2000:108; Hutchful 1999:8; Morrison
Taw & Grant-Thomas 1999). Great power pressure and UN intervention also
contributed, but mainly by lending additional strength and legitimacy to the
efforts by the regional organisation (Adebajo 2002a:51). The fairness and
durability of the peace agreements may be rightfully disputed, but the fact
remains that ECOWAS intervention helped to bring about at least temporary
solutions in situations that were highly unfavourable to negotiated settle-
ments. The disputes were long drawn-out and complex, and had not reached
obvious stalemates at the time of intervention. There was a large number of
parties, often internally divided, whose representatives had not always suffi-
cient authority to speak for their members (Such characteristics are seen as
indicating a low likelihood of negotiated peace by negotiation theorists; cf.
Bercovitch 1992:8; Susskind & Babbitt 1992:48). By the time ECOWAS
became involved in Liberia, 90 per cent of the country was already occupied
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by the rebel forces. In Sierra Leone, the military had already overtaken the
government when ECOWAS was asked to intervene (Tudor 2000; Clapham
2000). Nevertheless, ECOWAS managed to draft peace plans as the leading
mediator, plans that were later implemented, even if not in their original form.
Secondly, the probability is high that no substantial external interven-
tion at all would have taken place in the absence of regional initiatives
(Berman & Sams 2000:148). Great powers were quite willing to issue state-
ments and official condemnations, but were extremely reluctant to engage in
actual fighting (Adebajo 2002a). When UN troops were after all sent to Sierra
Leone – primarily because of the withdrawal of Nigerian ECOMOG
(ECOWAS Monitoring Group) troops from the country – they were ‘dramati-
cally under-equipped and ill-trained’ (Malone & Thakur 2001:16; cf.
Adebajo 2002a:99-101). The United Kingdom did indeed provide a contin-
gent of military personnel (besides its diplomatic and humanitarian
assistance), but only briefly and mainly to protect European civilians and 
UN personnel (Adebajo 2002a:93-94). US and EU logistical support after the
rapprochement between Nigeria and the main rebel leader, Charles Taylor, in
1996 did significantly help ECOMOG in its efforts to disarm Liberia’s
factions (Adebajo 2002a:62-63). Still, only committed regional actors seem to
have the motivation to employ sufficient numbers of troops for longer time-
periods (We will return to the material conditions that prevent them from
actually doing so). Thus, ECOWAS was the only actor who had the political
will necessary to assume primary responsibility for regional peacekeeping
(Berman & Sams 2000:148; Morrison Taw & Grant-Thomas 1999).
Thirdly, ECOWAS performed a number of important tasks that
contributed to the negotiated outcomes. In its mediating role, it functioned
both as a facilitator and a manipulator. ECOWAS was the convenor, or 
co-convenor, of most of the peace conferences arranged in both conflicts
(Tudor 2000; Clapham 2000). In this way, it forced the conflicting parties to
the negotiating table (even if all parties did not always participate) and
compelled them to take an official stance on the issues at hand. Combined
with its monitoring function, where ECOWAS reacted if actors did not follow
previous agreements – for example by breaking cease-fires, this meant that
the warring parties were put under constant pressure and could not abandon
their commitments at will. ECOWAS also made it clear that its members
would not recognise any government that came to power through force: 
‘military successes will not win the rebels legitimacy or recognition’ (UN
Special Report 1999:5). Denying any victorious rebel regime legitimacy was
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a significant weapon for ECOWAS and the international community. This
instrument fulfilled the first condition for successful mediation put up by
mediation scholars Susskind and Babbitt (1992:48): ‘disputants must realise
that they are unlikely to get what they want through unilateral action’.
According to some observers, threats of non-recognition were what made the
rebel factions come to the negotiating table (Haygood 1996). 
The position of ECOWAS as a committed and knowledgeable insider
certainly helped the organisation in its mediator performance. The organisa-
tion had, through its members, a functioning communication network with all
disputing parties and reliable information on developments both in the field
and on the political arena. This was despite, or perhaps because of, the splits
within ECOWAS itself, with different member states supporting different
parties to the conflicts (see below). Personal relations with all leading figures
were established, although trust was not always present. Its closeness to the
conflict arena and its connectedness to the disputants made it a privileged
mediator.
Fourth, ECOWAS acted as a peace enforcer and an active protector of
peace agreements. Through ECOMOG, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, the
organisation became an active part of the military struggle. In Liberia,
ECOMOG tried by force to protect its objectives in the peace process.
ECOMOG from time to time engaged in regular fighting with what it consid-
ered rebel forces (Adebajo 2002b; Tudor 2000:626; Haygood 1996). This was
motivated as a necessary step to defend the peace initiatives ECOWAS had
taken. In Sierra Leone, ECOMOG intervened to oust the military regime,
which had overthrown the previous elected government, that ECOWAS
wanted to reinstall (Clapham 2000). Although unable to defeat the rebels in
either country, the military engagement demonstrated resolve and sometimes
prevented coup makers from carrying out their intentions. By becoming a
military actor, siding with some factions against others, ECOWAS clearly
abandoned its pretensions of neutrality. This created, as we will demonstrate,
serious problems for ECOWAS in its mediator role. However, it may be
argued that partiality against non-democratic or lawless forces is at times
necessary for a regional intervener. In the words of Malone and Thakur
(2001:13), ‘the need for impartial peacekeeping should not automatically
translate into moral equivalence among the conflict parties on the ground’. 
A committed regional insider might be indispensable in order to protect
democratic forces against stronger autocratic opponents, when the UN is
unlikely to engage in such action.
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The Problems of Insider-partial Mediation
Although the work of ECOWAS has in the UN been heralded as ‘an important
example of a successful African peace-keeping mission’ (UN Press Release
1996), and as a ‘model for African peace-keeping’ (Rowe 1998), the Liberian
and Sierra Leone missions have both been fraught with difficulties and even
failures. One major problem, which they share with many UN interventions,
had to do with resources (Berman & Sams 2000:104-105; Hirsch 1999b).
Neither ECOWAS nor the UN mission had the financial resources or the
trained peacekeeping personnel necessary to properly carry out their tasks.
The ECOWAS members did not have the economic capacity to fund the
peacekeeping effort by their own means. The problems were somewhat 
alleviated by contributions from the UN and individual members of the 
international community (Adebajo 2002a:141), but still the amount available 
for the missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone was far from sufficient. This,
together with a sometimes alarming lack of professionality among the
ECOMOG troops (Yoroms 1999), had repercussions on the efficiency of the
interventions that were in fact marked by bad organisation and discipline.
Another serious obstacle for effective conflict management was the lack
of unity within ECOWAS. It turns out that established interpersonal relations,
a defining characteristic of mediation attempts by an insider-partial
according to Wehr and Lederach, can obstruct as well as facilitate 
co-operation. In the Liberian case, personal ties between the leaders of the
Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso and members of the Liberian ruling elite that
was ousted early on in the conflict, made these two ECOWAS members fund
the rebel army and help it with ammunitions and weapons – contrary to the
policy of ECOWAS as such (Adebajo 2002a:48; Clapham 1994; Inegbedion
1994). In Sierra Leone, Liberia and Burkina Faso morally and financially
supported rebel groups as ECOWAS struggled to convince the same rebels to
respect the cease-fire they had agreed upon. ‘The ECOWAS consensus on
regional peace has been fractured as Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Mali are
contributing peacekeeping troops in Sierra Leone to a peacekeeping effort
seemingly opposed by Liberia and Burkina Faso’ (Hirsch 1999a:3; cf.
Clapham 2000). The infamous ‘diamonds-for-guns trade’ gave many actors
powerful economic incentives to prolong the fighting. Fragmentation within
ECOWAS weakened its peace efforts and its credibility in general. Towards
the end of the Liberian conflict, when agreement on the necessity to end the
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fighting increased dramatically, not least because of the costs engendered by
refugee flows to many countries in the region, the pressure on the fighting
parties also increased and ECOWAS mediation became more effective 
(Tudor 2000). Nigeria’s decision to make peace with Taylor resulted in a more
positive approach from the francophone ECOWAS members, including 
troop contributions, thereby strengthening subregional unity (Adebajo
2002a:17, 44).
Finally, and especially important in this context, ECOWAS partiality
has been a major stumbling block hindering successful mediation. ECOWAS
has since its creation been associated with fears of Nigerian domination
(Adibe 1994:197; Adebajo 2002b). Not least, the francophone countries have
at times been suspicious of the intentions of the regional great power. As both
the interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were prompted by Nigeria, and
to a large extent relied on Nigerian troops (Inegbedion 1994; Yoroms 1999),
they were by some observers seen as expressions of Nigerian foreign policy,
rather than as West African peace initiatives (cf. Adebajo 2002b:245-247). 
It was furthermore claimed that the Nigerian president, Babangida, had
friendly ties with one of the actors involved in the Liberian power struggle 
(cf. Adibe 1994:197). There was thus ample evidence of relational partiality.
But the ECOWAS experience is also full of examples of processual 
and outcome partiality (Berman & Sams 2000:148-149; Hutchful 1999). As
indicated above, ECOMOG troops took part in actual fighting, siding with
some of the domestic factions against others. It is clear that the rebels
perceived ECOWAS and ECOMOG as yet another enemy (Barclay 1999;
Tudor 2000:622). Although the main aim of ECOWAS was to facilitate negoti-
ations between the rebels and the governments, or between different rebel
groups, its mediation efforts were often met by mistrust and suspicion by
many regime opponents. Despite the insistence of the Nigerian president that
‘[T]he ECOMOG is a peace force.... It is not an army of conquest or occupa-
tion.... The ECOMOG forces are soldiers without enemies or favored faction
in the conflict...’ (Babangida, quoted by Skau 2000), the rebel leaders obvi-
ously thought differently. But not only the rebels were sceptical; even
international observers like Jimmy Carter criticised ECOMOG for partiality
(Haygood 1996; cf. Adebajo 2002a:17). It is fair to conclude that ECOWAS
was seriously handicapped in its mediation efforts by its own lack of process
and outcome impartiality.
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Conclusion: An Advocacy of Insider-impartial Mediation
ECOWAS was clearly an insider mediator. Its member states had deep 
interests in the disputes and were directly affected by refugee flows, by the
fact that their citizens were trapped in the fighting and by the risk of diffusion
of regional insecurity. The states of the region are highly interconnected and
interdependent. This created strong incentives, both to put an end to the
fighting and to accomplish a lasting peace agreement.
The cases highlight both the advantages and the limitations of insider-
partial mediation. The ECOWAS missions distinctly demonstrate some of the 
benefits that come with being an insider mediator. A high commitment to 
the peace process was linked to deep knowledge of the conflict area and a
dense network of personal contacts. With the support of the international
community – and by peace forces in the war-plagued countries themselves –
ECOWAS finally succeeded in brokering cease-fire and peace agreements.
ECOWAS played the roles of facilitator and manipulator, and could pose a
credible threat of non-recognition to the warring factions. It is clear 
that ECOWAS contributed to a negotiated settlement, however temporary and
fragile. The outsider-neutral mediator, the UN, helped lend legitimacy to
ECOWAS policy initiatives and played a supportive but minor role in the
peace processes (cf. Adebajo 2002a:143). 
It is at the same time equally obvious that ECOWAS in some respects
was not ideal as a mediator. The lack of internal unity decreased the credi-
bility and consistency of its mediation efforts. Even more problematic was its
not very subtle partiality. It was by some actors perceived as one part among
others in the conflict, and not as a neutral mediator. An insider is probably
always relationally biased, but in this case ECOWAS was also blatantly
partial in the process and as regards the outcome.
Linking our findings to recommendations, we suggest that insider 
mediators should at least exhibit processual impartiality, not openly favouring
one or some of the parties to the detriment of others, if they want to achieve
durable solutions. It is not necessary, or even possible, for an insider mediator
to break up earlier bonds of friendship or personal relationships (relational
partiality). Open processual bias is, on the other hand, counterproductive in
mediation. Mediator unity is also strongly recommended; effectiveness is
heavily curtailed if actors within a mediating organisation pull in different
directions.
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In brief, mediation efforts by regional IGOs seem to be both necessary
and positive ingredients of any future global peace-building regime. Global
actors often hesitate to become involved in conflicts where their economic or
security interests are weak. Insider mediation holds many advantages – 
especially if it is also impartial in its handling of the mediation process.
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